


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION



ARTRAI ALEXANDER,  
Plaintiff,

v.

DALLAS COUNTY POLICE, ET AL.,  
Defendants.

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No. 3:16-CV-3304-N

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION**  
**OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an order of the District Court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge follow:

I.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is proceeding *pro se* and the Court has granted him leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Defendants are the Dallas Police Department, Dallas Police Investigators, Dallas Police Officers Hunt and Johnson, Dallas Detective Lawrence, and Dracelus Hunter. The Court has not issued process pending judicial screening.

Plaintiff states Dracelus Hunter falsely accused him of aggravated robbery. He states Officers Hunt, Johnson and Lawrence failed to properly investigate the charges, which led to his indictment for aggravated robbery and evading arrest. He states he was acquitted of aggravated robbery, but convicted of evading arrest. He states officers failed to fingerprint the gun involved in the alleged robbery, and failed to obtain a video of the alleged robbery. He claims officers

should have charged Hunter with a crime, and that his name was slandered by the false charges.

II.

Plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part:

The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from suit.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may also summarily dismiss a complaint filed *in forma pauperis* if it concludes the action is : (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]" *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." *Id.* at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

III.

1. *Heck v. Humphrey*

Plaintiff claims he was wrongfully convicted of evading arrest. His claims are barred by

the Supreme Court's decision in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). That decision holds that a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 action challenging his conviction or confinement unless and until the reason for his continued detention has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, or otherwise declared invalid by a state tribunal or federal court. *Heck* also bars damage claims, which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or pending charge. *Hamilton v. Lyons*, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996).

In this case, Plaintiff has not shown that his evading arrest conviction has been reversed or declared invalid. Hence, no § 1983 cause of action has yet accrued and these claims should be dismissed with prejudice until the *Heck* conditions are met. *See Johnson v. McElveen*, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (stating dismissal should be with prejudice until *Heck* conditions are met).

## **2. Dracelus Hunter**

Plaintiff claims Dracelus Hunter falsely accused him of aggravated robbery. To obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) a deprivation of that right by a defendant acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides in part that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only that action which may be fairly attributed to the States. *Shelley v. Kramer*, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The Fourteenth Amendment does not shield purely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. *Id.*; *see also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.*, 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398

U.S. 144, 169 (1970).

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to show that Dracelus Hunter acted under color of state law. Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant should be dismissed.

### **3. Investigation**

Plaintiff claims Officers Hunt, Johnson and Lawrence conducted an insufficient investigation which led to him being charged with aggravated robbery, and that these charges may have been reported in the media. A claim of negligent investigation, however, is not cognizable under § 1983. *Shadley v. Grimes*, 405 Fed. Appx. 813, 815 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing *Herrera v. Millsap*, 862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed.

### **4. Nonjural Entities**

Plaintiff alleges claims against the Dallas Police Department and Dallas Police Investigators. A plaintiff may not bring a civil rights action against a servient political agency or department unless such agency or department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. *Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't*, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991). A governmental department cannot engage in litigation "unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency jural authority." *Darby*, 939 F.2d at 313 (agency of city government). Governmental offices and departments do not have a separate legal existence. *See, e.g. Magnett v. Dallas County Sheriff's Department*, No. 3:96-CV-3191, 1998 U.S. Dist. WL 51355 at \*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998) (finding Dallas County Sheriff's Department not a legal entity); *Lindley v. Bowles*, No. 3:02-CV-595-P, 2002 WL 1315466 at \*2 (N.D. Tex. June 12, 2002) (finding Dallas County Jail is not a proper defendant with a jural existence). *Prenosil v. Dallas*

*County Jail*, No. 3:93-CV-1130-D, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1995) (same). These Defendants should therefore be dismissed.

IV.

The Court recommends that Plaintiff's complaint be summarily dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2).

Signed this 12 day of January, 2017.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Paul D. Stickney', written over a horizontal line.

PAUL D. STICKNEY  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

**INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT**

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).